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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

raise the forfeiture issue in the transfer proceedings. The court then
examined whether the Kerivans' failure to protest the transfers
precluded them from requesting the Department to initiate the
forfeiture proceedings. The Kerivans argued the transfer orders did
not affect their ability to seek forfeiture, claiming (1) the statute
provides "whenever" a right appears forfeited, the Department shall
initiate cancellation proceedings; and (2) the transfer application
must show either water was used or is not subject to cancellation.
Ultimately, the court held the transfer orders were "conclusive
evidence of the priority and extent of the appropriation therein," and
therefore the Department was not obligated to initiate forfeiture
proceedings. Thus, the court upheld the circuit court's judgment
dismissing the Kerivans' petition for judicial review and declaratory
relief complaint.
JaredB. Briant

Owen v. Div. of State Lands, 76 P.3d 158 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that depositing fill material on the existing footprint of a submerged
farm road to raise it above water level is "farm road maintenance"
under Oregon state law).
In 1987, Owen, through the nonprofit Redding Foundation, Inc.
("Redding"), purchased property zoned for exclusive farm use in
hopes of protecting wetlands on the property. A road through the
marsh provided the only access to the non-wetland portion of the
property. The road, approximately 500 feet long, existed since 1978.
Owen used the road several times a year and maintained it so that it
was passable to four-wheel drive vehicles. In late 1999 or early 2000,
part of the road became permanently submerged due to a silt
constriction in the Williamson River. Owen hired a contractor to raise
the roadbed above the water level by adding some 2600 cubic yards of
fill material.
On October 20, 2000, the Division of State Lands ("DSL") issued a
cease and desist order, directing Owen to stop fill activities on the
portion of the road that crossed the marsh on his property. DSL held
a hearing on April 3, 2001. On October 16, 2001, DSL issued its final
order, which adopted the findings of the hearing officer and
concluded that no permit exemption applied. Owen sought judicial
review of the DSL final order. Owen argued the fill was exempt from
permit requirements under Oregon law, which allowed maintenance
of farm roads as long as the maintenance did not significantly and
adversely affect wetlands. DSL argued the wetland statute controlled
and only exempted emergency reconstruction of "recently damaged
parts of currently serviceable roads," and because the road was
submerged, it was not currently serviceable, thus excluding permit
exemption.
The Oregon Court of Appeals first considered the meaning of the
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term "maintenance" as used in the wetland statute. The court
determined that maintenance, as used in the statute, means "keeping
something in a state of repair or efficiency." This, the court said,
suggested a functional baseline condition; in this instance, a road
above the water line.
Next, the court examined the meaning of "reconstruction" as used
in the statute. Here the court determined that, while reconstruction
differs from maintenance, there is an overlap in their meanings. The
court noted that reconstruction generally requires the nonexistence of
the object being rebuilt. However, because both words can mean
"repair," and, because the road was merely submerged, not
nonexistent, even if the fill work was reconstruction it was
reconstruction in the repair sense of the word.
Finally, the court noted that because the statute contains no
requirement that the road be serviceable, "the legislature's intention
was to treat farm roads differently from other roads." Serviceability,
the court determined, was not the distinguishing factor under the law.
Based on the legislative record, the court concluded that maintenance
as used in the statute included restoration to the "previously sound
and efficacious condition ...that [had] recently been lost."
Accordingly, the court reversed the DSL final decision.
Jeff Gillio

TEXAS
City of San Marcos v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-0200724-CV, 2003 WL 22024663 (Tex. App. Aug. 29, 2003) (holding
discharged effluent lost its distinguishable qualities when commingled

with the San Marcos River, therefore becoming part of the river
watercourse).
San Marcos River Foundation and Dr. Jack Fairchild
("Foundation") appealed the district court's ruling to uphold the
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's ("Commission")
decision granting the City of San Marcos ("City") a permit to convey
discharged wastewater effluent in the San Marcos River and then to
divert water from the river three miles downstream from the discharge
point. At the time of the controversy in question, Texas Code
required that no person appropriate or divert state water without first
obtaining a permit from the Commission. The City, believing it only
used the river as a vehicle to transport its privately owned water and
thus did not use state water, did not seek an appropriation permit in

their original application.
In 1997, while the City's original
application was still pending, the Texas Legislature passed the
comprehensive statewide water plan known as Senate Bill 1. Although
the Bill related directly to the types of reuse allowed in Texas, all

